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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARK C. DOYLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

FACILITIES, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

12912

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case for personal injuries allegedly sustained in
an accident on a construction job when the appellant, an employee of Steel Components, Inc., fell off the roof of a school
building which he was assisting to construct.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the defendant, Facilities, Inc.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Facilities, Inc., seeks affirmance of the Summary Judgment in its favor.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 5, 1969, Reed L. Oyler entered into a comral!
with the Weber County School District for the construction
of the Hooper School to be located at 5500 South 5900
Hooper, Utah. (Exhibit D-3).
'
On May 12, 1969, Reed L. Oyler entered into a
contract agreement with Tech Steel, Inc., wherein Tech Steel
'
Inc. agreed to furnish all labor and materials, tools, implementi
and equipment, scaffolding, permits, fees, etc., to do the steei
joists, structural steel, steel roof deck and miscellaneous metal
work on the Hooper School Building (Exhibit D-2).
In performing its subcontract agreement, Tech Steel, Inc
hired Facilities, Inc., the respondent herein, to furnish and erea
the structural steel and steel roof decking in the school.
was done by way of purchase order (Exhibit D-1). Facilicie>,
Inc., in turn, hired Steel Components, Inc., to place the steel
decking (Pre-trial Record, p.2). The plaintiff, Mark C. Doyle.
was an employee of Steel Components, Inc.
On October 20, 1969, while placing the steel roof deckini
on a portion of the Hooper School Building, the plaintiff fell
and sustained injuries. His Complaint alleges that the calllt
of his fall was the negligent installation of the structural stetl
by the employees and agents of Facilities, Inc.
Plaintiff filed for and received compensation and other
benefits afforded him under the Workmen's CompensationM
(Pre-trial Record, p.6)
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ARGUMENT
BENEFITS RECEIVED BY PLAINTIFF UNDER
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
CONSTITUTE HIS EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.
The Workmen's Compensation Act encompasses two primary objectives. The first is to assure that an injured employee
will receive the necessary medical and hospital care and modest,
but certain, compensation for his injuries with resulting benefits to himself and his family. The second objective is to afford
an employer protection against possible disastrous claims for
injuries which he may otherwise be unable to bear.
The definition of "employer" in the Workmen's Compensation Act is broad. It is designed to provide workmen's
compensation coverage to persons other than those regularly
on the "employer's" payroll. It reads, in part, as follows:
Where any employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over
whose work he retains supervision or control and such
work is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor and all persons employed by
him, and all subcontractors under him and all persons
employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed,
within the meaning of this section, employees of such
original employer . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Repl. vol. 1966).

Two recent Supreme Court cases hold that the exclusive
remedy of an employee of a subcontractor on a construction
project is that provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994
( 1972), this Court discussed the significance of the sub-con-
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cracr agreement between Alfred Brown Company and the SUD·
contractor. In the present case Clause 2 of the subcontract
agreement between Reed L. Oyler and Tech Steel ' Inc ., pro..
vided that:
The Subcontractor shall prosecute the work under.
taken in a prompt and diligent manner whenever such
work, or any part of it, becomes available, or in such
time or times as the GDntractor may direct, and so a1
to promote the general progress of the entire construe.
tion, and shall not, by delay or otherwise, interfere
with or hinder the work of the contractor or any other
subcontractor, and in the event that the Subcontractor
neglects and/ or fails to supply the necessary laoor ,
and/or materials, tools, implements, equipment, etc.
in the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor
shall notify the Subcontractor in writing setting form
the deficiency and/ or delinquency and five days after
date of such written notice, the Contractor shall have
the right if he so desires to take over the work of the
Subcontractor from any further participation in the
work covered by this agreement; or, at his option, the
Contractor may take over such portion of the SuD
contractor's work as the Contractor shall deem to De
in the best interest of the Contractor, and permit tht
Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portior!
of the work.
(Exhibit D-2) .
The foregoing clause is identical to the provision de·
termined "significant" in the Alfred Brown Co. case, where
this Court said:

If the total situation shown in this case, includini
the supervisory authority given the General Contractor
· v1ewe
· dinthe
Brown by the Clause 3 just quote d , 1s
.
10
light of the principles herein discussed as
the controlling statutes, the trial court was JUSttfte in
4

viewing the situation thus: that the defendant General
Contractor Brown had sufficient supervision and control over the 'subcontractors under him' that 'all persons employed by any such subcontractor' should be
deemed an employee of the general contractor defendant Brown; and that consequently the plaintiff would
be covered by workmen's compensation as an employee
of the latter and thus precluded from maintaining this
suit. Accordingly, the summary judgment was properly granted. 493 P.2d at 996.
On the same day that the Court handed down the decision
in the Alfred Brown Co. case, it also decided Peterson v. Fowler,
27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972). Suit was filed by the
dependents of a man who was killed when scaffolding on which
he was working at the Special Events Center at the University
of Utah collapsed, against an independent subcontractor,
Lauren Burt, Inc., who furnished and installed ceiling tile in
rhe dome of the Sports Center. The deceased was employed
by the general contractor. An award was made to the dependents of the deceased employee under the Workmen's Compnsation Act.
The defendant, Lauren Burt, Inc., was using rented scaffolding to aid in the installation of the ceiling tile. The deceased was employed by the general contractor to clean some
large supporting beams in the dome. An arrangement existed
between the general contractor and Lauren Burt, Inc., whereby
the deceased performed his cleaning work from the scaffolding.
The scaffolding failed and the workman was killed.
In affirming the decision of the trial court which had dismissed the action as to Lauren Burt, Inc., this Court said:
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To be fellow servants, they must be engaged·
the same
of work and labor
in such
sonal relations that they can exerose and influen
upon each other promotive of proper caution in resrrfl
of their mutual safety. They should be at the
the injury directly operating with each other in tht
particular business at hand, or they must be operatino
so that mutual duties bring them into such coassoci;
tion that they may exercise an influence upon
other to use proper caution and be so situated in thell
labor to some extent as to be able to supervise aaa
watch the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence,
and carefulness. When workmen are so engaged, we
think they are working in the same employment.
In the present case, Facilities, Inc., had the job of placini
and erecting the structural steel in the Hooper School. Tllli
included the erection of steel supports, I-beams which
on the supports, and steel joists which spanned from I-beam ro
I-beam. As the structural steel was place into position, tht
workmen from Steel Components, Inc., placed corrogated steel
sheets which formed the decking on the top of the steel
joists and welded them into place. The decking could
installed until the structural steel had been erected. The dej»
sition of the plaintiff shows that while the structural steel
being erected in one area of the building, steel decking
placed by him and his fellow employees in other portions o:
the building. (Depos., Mark Doyle, pp. 38-39). Obviouslf,
both of the subcontractors and their employees had to coordi
nate their efforts so as to perform the job in accordance wiili
the contract and with regard to the safety of each other.
The appellant contends that the present case 1s· disrin·
guishable from the Alfred Brown Co. and the Peterson ca56
. " sub contractor· However.
because he work ed f or a "fourt h tier
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the depDsition of the general contractor demonstrates that the
same degree of control and supervision was exercised over a
fourth tier subcontractor as would be exercised over a first
tier subcontractor. Mr. Oyler testified that he had control,
among other things, of the coordination of the subcontractor;
the safety of all workmen on the job; and the quality of the
product ( Depos., Reid Oyler, pp. 10-12). Reid Oyler also
testified that on a construction project such as was under completion at the time of the accident, the efforts of all subcontractors and their workmen must be coordinated. ( Depos., Reid
Oyler, pp. 15-16).
The function of Steel Components, Inc. and its employees,
and that of Facilities, Inc. and its employees, along with all
other subcontractors, was to perform an integral part of the
construction of the school building. It was the function of the
general contractor to complete the contract according to the
plans and to insure that all employees were working toward
this goal.
RespDndent contends that under the principle of Alfred
Brotin Co. and Peterson, the employees of Steel Components,
Inc., and the employees of Facilities, Inc., were fellow servants and were in the same employ. Therefore, the plaintiff's
exclusive remedy is that provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
CONCLUSION
The general contractor, Reed L. Oyler, was exerc1smg
supervision and control over the work being done by all of the
subcontractors and their workmen. All employees were in the
"same employment" as defined in the Act. The general con-
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tractor reserved the right of supervision and control of all sun
contractors and their employees. Further, the deposition o'.
the appellant, himself, establishes that there was a close worl
ing relationship between the workmen installing the stru(
tural steel and those installing the corrogated steel decking. All
workmen on the project were required to collaborate and worl
together under the general supervision of the general con.
tractor.
Because the plaintiff was in the "same
the defendant, the Workmen's Compensation Act provides
exclusive remedy. The Summary Judgment issued by the Trial,
Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN and
DAVID W. SLAGLE
Seventh Floor,
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for defendantrespondent
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